Information Elicitation without Veri cation (IEWV) is a classic problem where a principal wants to truthfully elicit high-quality answers of some tasks from strategic agents despite that she cannot evaluate the quality of agents' contributions. e established solution to this problem is a class of peer prediction mechanisms, where each agent is rewarded based on how his answers compare with those of his peer agents. ese peer prediction mechanisms are designed by exploring the stochastic correlation of agents' answers. e prior distribution of agents' true answers is o en assumed to be known to the principal or at least to the agents.
INTRODUCTION
Information Elicitation without Veri cation (IEWV) [25] is a classic problem where a principal wants to truthfully elicit high-quality answers of some tasks from strategic agents despite that she cannot evaluate the quality of agents' contributions. e lack of veri cation is either due to the subjective nature of the answers or because verifying answers is too costly to be practical. For example, a principal may be interested in knowing whether people nd each of a set of restaurants as a desirable place for Valentine's Day dinner. Or the principal may want to nd out whether each of a set of websites contains adult content.
A class of mechanisms, collectively called peer prediction [4, 5, 13, 15, 17, 22] , has been proposed for the IEWV problem. e high-level idea of these peer prediction mechanisms is to take advantage of the stochastic correlation of agents' answers for the same (or sometimes di erent) tasks and reward an agent based on how his answers compare with those of some peer agents. e reward functions of peer prediction mechanisms are designed in a way such that all agents truthfully reporting their answers (or exerting e ort to obtain high-quality answers and then truthfully reporting them) forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). is is quite marvelous to achieve given the lack of direct veri cation.
One major bene t of being able to elicit high-quality information from strategic agents without direct veri cation is that it can serve as a way to collect training samples for machine learning. In fact, ge ing training data from crowd workers (e.g., to label images and to collect personal data for social studies) has become a popular practice for machine learning [12, 21] . For instance, the abovementioned principal may want to train a classi er on elicited data to help her predict whether a new restaurant is Valentine's Day friendly or whether a new website contains adult content. Because people are error-prone and/or strategic, techniques on learning from crowd-generated training samples have been developed to innovatively handle the noise of the training data [2, 12, 16, 20] .
e above brief overview of the current status quo of solutions to the IEWV problem and how crowd-generated data are used to train machine learning algorithms reveals one interesting observation. We can view the tasks (e.g. restaurants and websites) that a principal wants to elicit information about as feature vectors x's and the desirable information about these tasks as their corresponding labels 's. en, the reward functions of existing peer prediction mechanisms are designed by leveraging the correlations of 's, because such correlation gives a way to accurately predict the true label for a particular feature vector and the prediction can be used as a benchmark to evaluate the elicited label for the feature vector, while machine learning algorithms trained on the elicited data aims to learn the correlation between x's and 's. Since the learned structural relationship between x's and 's can also o er a good prediction on the true label of any given feature vector, this suggests that we may take advantage of the correlation between x's and 's, in addition to the correlation of 's, to design peer prediction mechanisms that are possibly more e cient at eliciting information from strategic agents for heterogeneous tasks for IEWV and may have be er incentive properties. is is the approach that we take in this paper.
More speci cally, we design peer prediction mechanisms for eliciting binary labels from strategic agents for a set of heterogeneous tasks. Agents observe labels of tasks with errors (i.e. agents' observed labels sometimes are di erent from the true labels) and they can strategically decide whether to truthfully reveal their observed labels or not. e exact error rates are unknown to the principal. Our mechanism trains a classi er using the collected data, this classi er can generate a prediction on the label of a given feature vector and this prediction is then used as a machinegenerated reference report in a scoring function to evaluate a reported label for this feature vector. We nd that if the structural relationship between x's and the corresponding true 's is "learnable" in the sense that there exists a concept class F with bounded VC-dimension such that the optimal classi er f * ∈ F has performance that is be er than random guessing, which is a rather weak requirement for classi cation problems, then we can use the above described approach to design a peer prediction mechanism such that all agents truthfully reporting their observed labels is a BNE. In an e ort sensitive model where agents can incur a costly e ort to reduce the error of their observed labels, this result generalizes to induce a BNE where all agents exert the e ort and then truthfully report their observed labels.
e advantages of this machine-learning inspired approach and our designed mechanism include: (1) Our mechanism is more "e cient" in the sense that we do not need to assign every task to multiple agents to obtain redundant labels, while almost all existing peer prediction mechanisms depend on such redundant assignments. (2) Our mechanisms have be er incentive properties.
Everyone always reporting the same label or the same distribution of labels independent of the observed label or everyone always reporting a xed permutation of observed labels is not an equilibrium in our mechanism, while these are equilibria in existing peer prediction mechanisms. (3) Our mechanism allows the principal and the agents to have less knowledge about agents' observations. e principal and the agents do not need to know the error rates of the agent observations a priori and hence do not know the prior distribution of agents' labels. Many peer prediction mechanisms require that the principal knows the joint distribution of agents' labels to operate the mechanisms [9, 10, 15] . Most peer prediction mechanisms require agents know this joint distribution for the equilibrium results to hold [4, 9, 10, 15, 22] . (4) Our mechanism is especially suitable for heterogeneous tasks, while existing multi-task peer prediction mechanisms [4, 13, 22] have been designed for homogeneous tasks, with the exception of [14] . (5) A class of surrogate loss functions for binary classi cation can help us design reward functions for peer prediction.
At the technical level, our approach is built upon a set of machine learning techniques, o en referred as learning with "noisy data" [16] . is set of techniques helps to learn a classi er, using training data with known error, that converges to the optimal classi er as if it is trained on data without error. It o ers a way to counter the noise of the data to generate a good prediction on the true label of a feature vector. Our se ing has additional challenges in that the error of agents' observations is unknown and the reported labels are a result of agents' strategic decisions.
e rest of the work is organized as follows. We survey related work in the rest of this section. Our problem is formulated in Section 2. Section 3 introduces our approach, and reviews preliminaries on machine learning techniques that we build our results on. Our main results are discussed in Section 4.
en we discuss how we overcome the challenge of not knowing the errors of agents' observations in Section 5. In Section 6, we show how our mechanism can be adapted so that uninformative strategies do not form an equilibrium. A simple output agreement type of mechanism is then presented in Section 7. We show the extension of our results to e ort-sensitive workers in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper. Full version with appendix of this paper can be found on arXiv and the authors' websites.
Related work
Our work is an addition to an already large literature on peer prediction [4, 9, 10, 15, 17, 18, 27, 28] . e term peer prediction was coined up by Miller et al. [2005] who showed that any strictly proper scoring rule [7] for truthfully eliciting information about events with (future observable) ground truth can be turned into a scoring function for truthfully eliciting information for the IEWV problem if the principal knows the joint distribution of private signals and this distribution is common knowledge to all agents. e mechanism of Miller et al. [2005] has truthful reporting as a BNE. But it also has uninformative BNEs where all agents play a strategy that is independent of their observed signal. Moreover, agents receive higher payo at the uninformative BNEs than at the truthful BNE. One year prior to the publication of Miller et al. [2005] , Prelec [2004] proposed Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS), an elegant mechanism for IEVW that achieves truthful reporting as a BNE for a large enough population of agents by asking each agent to report not only his observed signal but also a prediction on the distribution of others' reports. While BTS still requires agents to know the joint distribution of private signals for the truthful BNE to hold, the principal in BTS doesn't need to know this distribution to operate the mechanism. BTS also admits uninformative equilibria. A sequence of follow up work has been done to relax the assumptions made by these mechanisms [18, 27, 28] and to make the truthful reporting equilibrium more focal [10] . More recently, Witkowski et al. [2013] and Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] formally studied an e ort sensitive model for eliciting binary signals for IEWV. In particular, Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] proposed a multi-task peer prediction mechanism that ensures a desirable BNE where every agent rst exerts maximum e ort to obtain a high-quality signal and then truthfully reports it. Moreover, among all BNEs, this equilibrium gives the highest payo to all agents. Shnayder et al. [2016] and Kong and Schoenebeck [2016] then extended the results to non-binary signal elicitation. However, in all existing mechanisms, there exists BNEs where agents play an uninformative reporting strategy, although such equilibrium leads to lower agent payo than the truthful equilibrium in the recent mechanisms of Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] , Shnayder et al. [2016] and Kong and Schoenebeck [2016] . Furthermore, agents reporting a xed permutation of signals is also a BNE in existing mechanisms and this equilibrium o ers the same payo to agents as the truthful equilibrium. Our mechanism in this paper removes both the uninformative equilibria and the permutation equilibrium.
Our mechanism uses a "machine" prediction as a reference answer. is has some resemblance to the notion of creating a reference answer from a model's output. Several studies focused on using models that aggregate answers from di erent agents [6, 11, 19] . ese studies didn't consider a machine learning se ing like us, and didn't establish equilibrium behavior.
From a di erent angle, our work ts into the notion of learning with strategic data sources, which concerns machine learning systems when either their training data or incoming test data or both come from strategic agents. For example, several recent results have focused on optimally training regression models via incentivizing high-quality training data, when they are collected from strategic agents who are either e ort sensitive [2] or privacy sensitive [3, 8] . Our work focuses on classi cation problems.
In machine learning, how to learn appropriately with non-strategic, yet biased data has received quite a bit of a ention in recently [16, 20] . We demonstrate yet another novel application of these methods for information elicitation. In some sense, our work completes this line of research by demonstrating that a method for learning from noisy training data can also be made Bayesian incentive compatible for eliciting the training data.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
A principal has a set of data {x i } N i=1 , where each x i ∈ R M can be viewed as an M-dimensional feature vector. e space of x i 's is X. is set of data has corresponding (binary) labels,
where i ∈ {−1, +1}, that are unknown to the principal. {(x i , i )} N i=1 are drawn i.i.d. according to an unknown joint distribution D. e prior probabilities for the +1 and the −1 labels are P + and P − respectively. e principal knows P + and P − . She can ask a set of agents (e.g. crowd workers) to label the data. Without knowing the true labels, she cannot directly verify the elicited labels.
e principal would like to design reward mechanisms so that she can obtain high-quality labels from the agents.
Agent model
e principal recruits T ≥ N agents (workers). Each worker i is assigned exactly one data point, denoted x i (with a bit abuse of notation), and is asked to report a labelˆ i . Each data point is assigned to one worker and sometimes more. 1 e re-assigned tasks are randomly selected, and if selected the task will be re-assigned once (so assigned twice in all, for details please refer to Section 5). Denote U as the set that contains each independent task exactly once, so |U | = N . We consider two worker observation models in this paper: an e ort insensitive model where each worker exogenous observes a label with noise and an e ort sensitive model where a worker can choose to exert costly e ort to improve the accuracy of his observation. We introduce the e ort insensitive model below. Our analysis in the next few sections will focus on this model. en, we will introduce the e ort sensitive model and extend our main results to it in Section 8.
E ort insensitive worker observation model: Each worker observes a signal (which is the worker's observed label) once a task is assigned. Denote worker i's observation for data x i as˜ i . Worker observations are conditionally independent (on i ) and follow a two-coin ipping-error model: Pr(˜ i = −1| i = +1) = p + and Pr(˜ i = +1| i = −1) = p − , where p + and p − satisfy: (i) p + + p − < 1, that is, the sum of the error rates for the two classes is less than 1.
is assumption requires that a worker's observation is informative with respect to the true label in the sense that the probability for the worker to observe label s is higher when the true label is s than when the true label is −s, i.e. Pr(
It is a necessary and su cient condition so that Bayesian updating increases one's belief that the observed label is the true label. is is formally stated in Lemma 2.1.
Similar assumptions are made for agent belief models in the peer prediction literature [4, 22] . (ii) p − ,p + ≥ κ > 0 where 0 < κ < 1/2. at is, workers do not have perfect information.
We assume that the error models are common knowledge to both the workers and the principal. e prior on true labels, P + and P − , are common knowledge too. But the principal and the workers do not necessarily know the values of p + and p − . Most of our discussion in this paper focuses on homogeneous workers that have the same p + and p − , but we discuss the possibility of extending to the case with heterogeneous workers in the Appendix.
A er observing the signals, each worker i decides on which label to report. A pure reporting strategy of an agent is a mapping from the agent's observation to a report: r i (˜ i ) : {−1, +1} → {−1, +1}. In the case of mix strategies, the mapping is to a distribution on the two possible reports {−1, +1}. For example, a truthful reporting strategy corresponds to the case that an agent truthfully reports his observation, and an uninformative strategy, pure or mixed, has the same report distribution for all signals. We then de nep i,+ := Pr(
as the ipping error rates of agent i's report when he plays strategy r i (˜ i ). Workers can be incentivized via payment, and they would like to maximize their expected payment.
The principal's design objective
e principal wants to design a reward mechanism M to incentivize agents to contribute highquality labels. Under the e ort insensitive model, this means that the principal would like the agents to truthfully report their observed labels. Under the e ort sensitive model, the principal wants agents to exert e ort to obtain more accurate labels and then truthfully report them. Since the principal cannot directly verify the contributed labels, the mechanism can only reward agents based on the data and the reported labels collected from the T agents, i.e.
. e principal would like to achieve the above high-quality elicitation at a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) and ideally remove other BNE where the elicited labels are of lower quality. In this paper, we focus on symmetric BNEs where agents' strategies r i (˜ i ) are the same.
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OUR APPROACH
In this section we rst describe our approach toward designing the principal's mechanism. en, we brie y introduce a set of machine learning techniques, learning with "noisy data" (when the rates of ipping errors are known), that our approach is built upon.
Design of scoring function and reference answer using Machine Learning
In designing a mechanism M, the principal needs to choose a scoring function S ((
. In this paper, we consider a smaller design space where the mechanism's scoring function for each agent i is of the form:
where
. F is the concept class that algorithm A maps into and hence f
In other words, we consider mechanisms that reward a worker based on how his reported label compares to that of a prediction of a learning algorithm, where the algorithm is trained on the data and the reported labels of other agents. Hence, a mechanism M in this paper is a tuple (S, A).
As mentioned earlier, the principal would like to obtain high-quality labels at a BNE. Denote
as agent i's belief about the realized labels of all agents a er agent i has observed his own label. en a mechanism M = (S, A) induces a (strictly) truthful BNE if
In the rest of the paper, we'll write
for notation simplicity, but a reader should understand the dependency of f on algorithm A and training dataset K −i . e scoring function (1) resembles those designed in the peer prediction literature for the IEWV problem in the sense that it scores an agent's report against a benchmark that is based on other agents' reports. But it has some fundamental di erences. Existing peer prediction mechanisms use scoring functions that are completely de ned over agents' reports:
e second argument of the scoring function for many peer prediction mechanisms is simply the report from a random peer agent for the same task. In some more recent mechanisms, this second argument includes agents' reports on other tasks but still needs to contain reports from peer agent for the same tasks [4, 22] . In contrast, the scoring function in (1) incorporates the feature vectors x i 's. It doesn't require that we have to have redundant reports for the same task (except for a small number of selected re-assigned tasks). Instead, we seek to learn a machine predictor f from a heterogeneous set of data to generate the second argument in the scoring function S.
Our approach toward designing a mechanism to induce a truth-telling BNE takes two-steps. First, assuming agents reports truthfully, we focus on designing an algorithm A such that, although it is trained on data with ipping errors, it outputs a function f that converges to the optimal classi er f * ∈ F as if it is trained on data without ipping errors. e algorithm A "counters" the noise in the reported data. is guarantees that if everyone else report truthfully, the reference report f (x i ) for agent i is an accurate prediction of the true label i when the number of data is large. Second, we design the scoring function S such that truth-telling is the best action for agent i if the agent knows that his reference report is an accurate prediction of the true label i . Now, the agent's observed label has noise as a result of the ipping errors, but the reference report does not in expectation. When designing the scoring function, we engage a similar "counter-noise" technique as the machine learning algorithm does in the previous step. ese two steps together ensure that truth-telling is a BNE in the resultant mechanism (S, A). At the technical level, our approach is built on a set of machine learning techniques, o en referred as learning with "noisy data" [16] . If ipping errorsp + andp − of training data are known to the principal, this set of techniques can learn an f that converges to the optimal classi er f * in classi cation risk from the noisy training data. In our se ing, however, the principal does not know the ipping-error rates in the reported data due to lack of knowledge of both p + and p − and agents' strategies. is poses additional challenge of nding such an f . We will defer the details on learning the ipping-error rates to Section 5.
Learning with noisy labels
We now introduce the techniques for learning with noisy lables, which our mechanisms will build upon. ough there are clear di erences between di erent methods for learning with noisy labels, the basic idea tends to build on nding surrogate loss functions that can compensate the bias in training data, when evaluating a function f ∈ F . We brie y survey a particular algorithm and its results from Natarajan et al. [2013] , in hope of delivering the idea on how learning can be done in face of biased data.
Preliminaries:
, and a general l loss as
. Denote the minimum risk over the concept class as
e setup of Natarajan et al. [2013] assumes that the ipping-errors of the reports are the same across all agents, that isp + :=p 1,+ = ... =p N ,+ andp − :=p 1,− = ... =p N ,− , andp + +p − < 1. Furthermore, the principal knows the values ofp + andp − . ( is can be viewed as a special case of our se ing where the principal knows p + and p − and every agent truthfully reports his observed signal.) Suppose the principal has collected N i.i.d. training samples {(x j ,ˆ j )} N j=1 , indexed from 1 to N . e naive approach of directly minimizing empirical 0-1 loss over reported data not only is technically di cult but also would give a biased classi er that may not converge to the optimal classi er. Natarajan et al. [2013] tackle this problem by rst nding a convex and classi cation-calibrated (CC) loss function l (t, ) (with prediction t and label as the inputs), where CC is de ned as follows:
e introduce of a convex loss function l helps to remove the computational challenge in minimizing 0-1 loss directly. Classi cation-calibration helps us control the 0-1 loss via controlling the l-loss, i.e., if we nd a classi er that converges to the optimal one in l-loss, its 0-1 loss also converges. It is generally possible to assume the existence of such an l [1, 16] . Particularly it is shown in by Bartle et al. [2006] that, if the loss function can be wri en as l (t, ) = ψ ( t ) where ψ is convex and di erentiable at 0 with ψ (0) < 0, then l is classi cation-calibrated. Following above assumptions, we assume such an l exists for now.
Natarajan et al.
[2013] then further de ne an "un-biased" surrogate loss functions over l to help "remove" noise, whenp + +p − < 1:
where sgn(·) is a sign function that sgn(+1) = +, sgn(−1) = −. e surrogate loss φ is de ned such that when a prediction is evaluated against a noisy label using this surrogate loss function, the prediction is as if evaluated against the ground-truth label using l in expectation. Hence the loss of the prediction is "unbiased" in expectation. is is formally stated in Lemma 3.2 below.
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, where˜ is the report from nonstrategic workers with known ipping errors, and is the ground-truth label.
Natarajan et al. [2013] proceeds to nd a classi er via minimizing the empirical risk w.r.t. φ (·):
e performance guarantee forf * φ is given by the following lemma. L 3.3 (T 3 [16] ). With probability at least 1 − δ ,
is the Rademacher complexity of function class F .
Sine the VC dimension of the concept class F is nite [23] , we have a converging (F ) = O log VCDim(F )/N . Also as l is classi cation calibrated, this lemma guarantees that the 0-1 risk off * φ converges to that of R * . It also implies that the smallerp + ,p − are, the faster the error convergence is.
Other successful examples in de ning surrogate loss functions for dealing with biased training data include label dependent cost surrogate loss [16, 20] . e idea is to scale up the loss function di erently for di erent labels; e.g., the following one was also studied by Natarajan et al. [2013] :
MECHANISM AND RESULTS FOR ELICITING TRUTHFUL REPORTS
In this section, we will establish that a class of surrogate loss functions can both serve to train a classi er to provide an accurate reference answer and be used as peer prediction scoring functions for eliciting truthful reports. en we show that our mechanism no longer admit the undesirable permutation equilibrium. To be er deliver the intuition of our mechanism, we will present our mechanism and results assuming everything is "learnable" in this section. Particularly we will assume that the principal can estimate the ipping error rates of the reported data and the optimal classi er to arbitrary accuracy. While this is obviously too strong to assume without investigation, this assumption allows us to focus on establishing the equilibrium results of our mechanism, given that we have access to such accurate estimates. Later in Section 5, we will show how to obtain such accurate estimates from the reported data if agents are playing some symmetric strategies.
When a distribution is elicitable via Machine Learning?
While we seek to use machine learning (ML) to help data elicitation, asking ML methods to help eliciting arbitrarily distributed data is likely over demanding. A er all, we are hoping that the learned structural relationship between x and can provide a good prediction of for any given x and this prediction is then used as a reference answer for scoring a reported label for this x. If the structural relationship cannot be learned, we shouldn't hope that this approach can help us to achieve be er elicitation. We formalize this idea as ML elicitability:
De nition 4.1 (ML elicitability). (x, ) ∼ D is ML elicitable, if there exists a mechanism M = (S, A) that satis es Eqn. (2) , that is, M induces a (strictly) truthful BNE for workers who have been assigned tasks drawn from D.
ML elicitability intends to capture when the structural relationship between x and is "learnable" so that a machine prediction can be used in peer prediction scoring to induce the truthful reporting BNE. Classic peer prediction has an analogous concept: most existing peer prediction mechanisms admit the truthful BNE only when signals of agents are stochastic relevant [15, 29] , a condition that essentially captures when the correlation of agents' signals are strong enough so that peer reports can be used in scoring to induce the truthful reporting BNE.
We now introduce a set of ML elicitability conditions. We will design mechanisms in Section 4.2 that induce the truthful reporting BNE when these conditions are satis ed. ML elicitability conditions:
ere exists a concept class F , with each decision function f ∈ F mapping a feature vector x ∈ X to a prediction on label (i.e. f : X → { − 1, +1}), that has a bounded Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension [23] , VCDim(F ) < ∞.
)] ≤ 0.5 for ∈ {−1, +1}.
From a learning perspective, these ML elicitability conditions are rather weak learnability conditions. All they require is that there exists a f * that comes from a concept class with bounded VC dimension (learnable in nite samples), and it can separate the data from one class to another with its 0-1 prediction performance being strictly be er than random guess. Condition (3) states that the optimal classi er f * does not perform worse than random guess on both classes' conditional distributions. roughout this paper, we assume for the data distribution of interest, the principal is aware of such an F (but not f * ). Denote its VC dimension as d := VCDim(F ).
Main Mechanism
With the above preparation, we now construct a mechanism that induces the truthful BNE when the ML elicitability conditions are satis ed.
MECHANISM 1: ML Prediction (MLP)
For each worker i:
1. Assign tasks, and estimate ipping errorsp −i,+ ,p −i,− based on reported data from workers j i (Mechanism 2).
-When returned solution satis esp −i,+ +p −i,− 1, continue.
-Otherwise trigger exception handler (Mechanism 4), and stop. e basic recipes of the mechanism are as follows. First, for each agent i, assuming that other agents play a symmetric strategy, the principal estimates the ipping-error rates of other agents' reports (denote the estimates asp −i,+ andp −i,− ). en, an estimated surrogate loss functionφ (·) (any surrogate loss function that can learn from noisy data, e.g., the ones in Eqn.(3) and (6)) de ned usingp −i,+ andp −i,− allows the principal to train a classi erf * φ,−i , with its prediction performance converging to the optimal one. en we use this classi er to make prediction on worker i's assigned data, to serve as a "machine prediction" instead of "peer prediction". Finally, we construct a reward 
De neφ (·) using (p
as de ned in Eqn. (3), with (ˆ i ,f * φ (x i )) being its inputs. Whenp −i,+ +p −i,− = 1, the assumptions made in existing learning with noisy data methods will be violated, in that both the surrogate loss function and its training steps are not well de ned. We handle this exception case in Section 6.
We'd like to focus on the equilibrium analysis of our proposed mechanism in this section, thus for now, we assume that the principal can accurately learn the error rates in the reported data if the reported data are generated from either a symmetric truthful reporting strategy or a symmetric permutation strategy, and hence the principal can approximate the surrogate loss functions de ned using these error rates and the optimal classi er well.
A 1 (I ).
When either all agents j i play the truthful reporting strategy or they all play a permutation strategy, the principal can obtain arbitrarily accurate estimatesp −i,+ ,p −i,− ,φ, andf * φ,−i . at is, there exist positive constants ϵ,ϵ 1 ,δ 1 ,ϵ 2 , and δ 2 s.t. 
(3) With probability at least 1 − δ 2 , R D (f * φ,−i ) − R * ≤ ϵ 2 . All terms ϵ,ϵ 1 ,δ 1 ,ϵ 2 , and δ 2 can be made arbitrarily small with increasing number of samples N .
is assumption is made entirely for the sake of presentation. Particularly, Assumption 1 will be used in place of Steps 1 and 2 of Mechanism 1. Later in Section 5, we will show how to estimate the error rates of the reported data to satisfy this assumption.
Assuming workers have perfect knowledge of the mechanism, and know that ML elicitability conditions are satis ed. Our next theorem shows that S (·) := −φ unbias (·), along with the Assumption 1 induces strictly truthful BNE. Intuition: Proving above theorem hinges on the following facts: rst when agents truthfully report, we know their score is going to converge to −E[l ( f * (x), )], negative of the minimum l-loss, due to the fact that the surrogate loss function calibrates the noise in agent's report. en we show that deviating to other strategies will introduce l ( f * (x), − ) term into the expected score. is leads to higher surrogate loss, due to the fact that l ( f * (x), − ) = l (−f * (x), ) and informativeness of f * w.r.t. the ground-truth label . For easiness of presentation we will omit the unbias subscript in φ, and when we use φ we meant the un-bias surrogate loss function de ned in Eqn. (3). Also we will short hand f * (x) as f * .
P
. (Sketch) Consider agent i. Denote the reporting strategy as follows:ˆ i =˜ i ·(−1) r (˜ i ) ,r (˜ i ) ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., based on the observation˜ i , the agent can decide whether to truthfully report (r (˜ i ) = 0), or revert the answer (r (˜ i ) = 1). All together the agent has four possible pure strategies: {−1, +1} × {0, 1}. It is straightforward to argue that any other strategy can be wri en as a linear combination of the four, i.e., these four strategies form the basis of the strategy space. erefore we only need to check that truth telling is strictly proper among the four strategies. 2 First note
e above convergence is due to Assumption 1, as well as the fact that we consider the case agents j i are truthfully reporting, so thatp −i,+ = p + ,p −i,− = p − . We will then reason with this clean case with (φ, f * ), as we can always bring down the approximation error via increasing N .
By truthfully reporting r (˜ i ) ≡ 0, agent i's expected utility is:
en we rst prove the following fact:
, which is essentially saying f * performs strictly be er than −f * in l-loss. is will help us prove non-pro tability for the case that r (˜ i ) ≡ 1, that is the agent always reverts the answer. In this case we have (replacing (x i , i ) pair with (x, ) in notation)
and we prove that conditional on each label ∈ {−1, +}
and thus
]. Yet the two inequalities in Eqn. (8) and (9) cannot hold simultaneously, as otherwise we will have
us we have proved that reverting is strictly dominated by truthfully reporting. Consider the case that agents only revert one observation: denote α + :=
We will then prove that
Since the sum of the expected surrogate loss for cases of reporting˜ , −˜ is the same as the sum for the other two reporting strategies that only revert "half" of the observations, we have
Since
and the fact that Eqn. (10) holds, we must have both terms on the RHS of Eqn. (11) being larger than E[φ ( f * ,˜ i )] -so their negatives (reward) are smaller than truthful reporting.
We can also similarly show that, (MLP) doesn't admit a permutation equilibrium. Almost all existing peer prediction mechanisms [4, 13, 22, 26] have a permutation BNE. Intuitively, when workers reach an agreement on permuting their reports according to a xed order, it's di cult for the the principal to tell the day from night. While Assumption 1 assumes this di culty away, in Section 5, we'll show that we can still correctly estimate the error rates of the reported data (hence can tell the day from night) even if agents all permute their reports. It may be noticed that in this casep −i,+ +p −i,− > 1, which violates the assumption for surrogate loss function based learning we introduced in Section 3.2. However we will show that plugging this pair of true error rates into the surrogate loss functions will help revert the surrogate loss function back to the one as if workers are truthfully reporting (Eqn. 16). So in training, it is as if we are reverting the label back. us the learning part will still go through.
In practice, how to select the number of samples so to make the error terms in Assumption 1 small enough depends on how faster the trained classi er converges, which can be quanti ed using our analysis in Section 5. O en the large enough quantity is a function of the following parameters:
, which control the di culties of learning.
It may be noticed that in order to run Mechanism 1, we need to train a classi er for each worker to provide a reference answer, which raises computational concerns. Practically we only need to train two classi ers. Consider separating the group of workers into two groups with equal sizes, completely randomly and uniformly; let's call these two groups as G A and G B . Each of the group has size |G A |,
using data from group G B and G A respectively. For worker i in group G A , reward him using
. Similarly we will reward a worker from group G B usingf * φ,−G B
. is signi cantly reduces the e ort for re-training.
LEARNABILITY OF ERROR RATES, AND SURROGATE LOSS FUNCTIONS
In our se ing, the principle doesn't know the ipping-error rates in agents' reported data. In this section we discuss the challenges for the learning due to unknown ipping errors and how we address them. We note that many, if not all, of the surrogate loss function based methods that we are aware of for solving the learning with noisy labels problem, e.g. the ones de ned in Eqn.(3) and (6) , require the knowledge of the error rates of the noisy input data. In practice, however, this is hardly the case. In this section, we discuss the concept of learnability ofp −i,+ ,p −i,− for each agent i, and further the surrogate loss. We'll show that our learning process satis es Assumption 1 when all other agents play either the truthful or a permutation strategy.
We assume that the principal knows the lower bounds of the following quantities: ∆ := 1/2 − R * and δ p := 1 − (p + + p − ). e principal would need such knowledge to decide the number of training samples N to be elicited such that the learning of the error rates converges.
First we demonstrate how to estimatep −i,+ ,p −i,− , and prove a couple of consistency results under noisy labels. Assuming agents play a symmetric strategy, our method starts with estimating the following two quantities that can be computed from the collected/reported data directly:
(i) Matching probability: this is the probability when a task is assigned to two di erent workers, the chance of the outputs match each other. Denote this quantity as q. In order to evaluate the matching on the same task, we need to re-assign the tasks. First we separate the tasks into two sets: we will randomly select K (to ensure enough samples for an accurate estimation) tasks to re-assign to one more worker 3 . Denote the set of re-assigned tasks as U r . Suppose T = K + N . Estimate for worker j i:q −i := 1 |U r \{i}| n ∈U r \{i } 1(there is a match on task n).
(12)
(ii) Fraction of +1/-1 labels that we observe from workers' contribution P + ,P − ; denoteP −i + ,P −i − as the corresponding estimations for workers j i:
1(task n has label -1).
(13)
MECHANISM 2: Estimation ofp + ,p − 1. Assign data; randomly select K of the tasks to re-assign once; estimateq −i ,P −i − as in Eqn. (12) and (13). 2. Solve the following set of equations.
Denote the solution(s) asp −i,+ ,p −i,− . 3. When there are more than one solution, call Mechanism 3. 4. Return the selected root, or no solution to Mechanism 1.
We propose Mechanism 2 for learningp −i,+ ,p −i,− . e set of equations set up in Mechanism 2 aims to estimate the error rates in agents' reported data when agents play a symmetric strategy. When workers are arbitrarily reporting, the solution for the system of equations in Mechanism 2 leads to meaningless numbers, or simply there does not exist a solution. When workers are reporting according to symmetric strategies 4 , the rst equation characterizes the probability of observing a matching signal, while the second one characterizes the fraction of observed negative samples. Note that the second equation is also equivalent with P + (1 −p −i,− ) + P −p−i,− =P −i + , i.e., the equation for probability of observing a positive signal. Readers may also notice that there may exist more than one pair of solutions from the system of equations we have formed ((I) & (II)), due to its quadratic form. Nevertheless the following result holds, which will help remove this ambiguity. When agents are truthfully reporting, the above estimation algorithm is ready to give us the right ipping error rate if we choose the pair s.t.p −i,+ +p −i,− < 1 a er step 2 and terminate without going into step 3. But this won't give us the right solution if agents play a permutation strategy. Mechanism 3 makes the estimation robust to permutation strategies. 
When P + − P − < 0, return the solutionp −i,+ ,p −i,− s.t.,
e basic implication of Mechanism 3 is that when there is ambiguity in root selection, we select the solution withp −i,− ,p −i,+ being further away from each other in ratio. Note (1) our solution does not cover the case P + = P − . (2) In the above selection, when agents truthfully report, the solution satisfyingp −i,+ +p −i,− < 1 will be selected (see proof in our full version). (3) When agents report a permutation of their signals, the solution captures the actual ipping error rates in the reports, i.e. p −i,+ approaches to 1 − p + andp −i,− approaches to 1 − p − .
We thus have the following consistency results in estimating the error rates in the reported data using Mechanism 2. L 5.2. When agents j i are either all truthfully reporting or all reporting permuted signals, and when K, N are large enough, w.p.
is can be established based on our estimation ofq −i ,P −i − , followed by perturbation analysis on solving the quadratic equations in Mechanism 2.
Denote byφ (, ) the noisy surrogate loss function de ned using estimated (p −i,+ ,p −i,− )s. With above consistency results, we de ne "learnable surrogate loss function":
De nition 5.3 (Learnable surrogate loss function). A surrogate loss function φ (, ) is learnable in p −i,+ ,p −i,− , if for any δ ,ϵ > 0, there exists a (K, N ) pair such that with probability at least 1 − δ , we have |φ (t, ) − φ (t, )| ≤ ϵ,∀t, .
For example, consider the un-biased surrogate loss function proposed in [16] . Recall in this case we will haveφ
Using Lemma 5.2, we prove the following (following notations in Lemma 5.2) L 5.4. When agents j i are either all truthfully reporting or all reporting permuted signals, and when K, N are large enough s.t. ϵ 1 (K, N )+ϵ 2 (K, N ) ≤ δ p /2., with probability at least 1−δ 1 
So the φ is indeed learnable for this case. is claim is generally not uncommon for the others, but the analysis is rather ad-hoc. In this paper we focus on surrogate loss functions that are learnable.
With the same set of training data {x i ,ˆ i } N i=1 as we assumed in Section 3.2, denotef * φ = argmin f ∈ FRφ ( f ) as the optimal classi er trained using the learned surrogate loss function. Denote the distribution over (x,˜ ) ( workers' observed labels) as D ρ .
When agents truthfully report such thatp + +p − < 1, using sample complexity bound, we can prove that with probability at least 1 . We assert that this is also true when agents' permute their signal s.t.p + = 1 − p + ,p − = 1 − p − andp + +p − > 1. Consider the following fact
where φ (t, − ) denotes the surrogate loss de ned over the error rates p + ,p − when workers truthfully report. So in training, it is as if we are reverting the label back. erefore the trained classi er will be converging to the optimal one, instead of its opposite. e following lemma shows that the estimation error in surrogate loss function wouldn't a ect the learning results by much (δ ,ϵ as in De nition 5.3).
Above lemma, along with the classi cation calibration property of l, let us know that training withφ (·), despite the noise, will let us converge to the optimal classi er f * : L 5.6. For any (ϵ,δ ) > 0 pair, there exists large enough K, N such that with probability at
UNINFORMATIVE STRATEGIES
We show the above mechanism can help eliminate undesirable uninformative equilibria that exist in peer prediction literature. ough we are not really comparing two agents' outputs (may it be simple output agreement, or more sophisticated ones) for sending payment, it is possible that workers reporting the same labels leads to trivial reference answers that favor collusion. We show that with the call to Mechanism 4, agents reporting a symmetric uninformative strategy is not a BNE in our mechanism. T 6.1. In Mechanism 1, (1) reporting symmetric uninformative pure signal is not an equilibrium. (2) Reporting symmetric uninformative mixed signal with randomization probability p 1/2 is also not an equilibrium.
We rst observe that when agents report according to uninformative strategies, we will havẽ p −i,+ +p −i,− = 1. us Mechanism 1 will trigger a call to Mechanism 4. When the de-bias technique cannot be applied, we will randomly select another worker's report as a reference answer, and plug it into the scoring function, which creates a penalty for agreement. When there doesn't exist solution forp −i,+ ,p −i,− , we will score agent a su ciently small value to ensure that truth-telling returns higher payment. Knowing only bounds on p + ,p − would allow us the estimate a lower bound for min −φ unbias (·). In practice, a er we shi the score in Mechanism 1 to be positive (use a ne transformation, for individual rationality), the payment for this case can be set to 0. 
P
. W.l.o.g., we consider the case workers contribute uninformative signals by always reporting label -1. Consider worker i. According to our estimation Eqn. (12) and (13), we havẽ q −i = 1 (always match),P −i − = 1. Plug back in Mechanism 2:
Since P +p−i,+ ≤ P + , P − (1 −p −i,− ) ≤ P − , and P + + P − = 1, we know the only possible case that equation (II) holds is when both of the equalities hold. So we are led to the solution that p −i,+ = 1,p −i,− = 0. Not hard to validate the above solution also satis es Equation (1). According to Mechanism 4, we resetp −i,− := κ > 0. en the scoring function for agent i becomes: 5
For simplicity of presentation, we drop the subscript and use φ to denote φ unbias .
So to maximize the score it is pro table for agent i to reportˆ i = +1 ⇒ workers contributing the same uninformative signal is not an equilibrium.
e case with mixed uninformative strategy can be argued in a similar avor (see full version).
A SIMPLE MACHINE OUTPUT AGREEMENT MECHANISM
We have established the fact that a class of surrogate loss functions, combined with the classi er trained with it, can serve as a peer prediction scoring function that induces strictly truthful BNE. Likely there exist many other scoring functions that can also incorporate the machine prediction in peer prediction scoring. Probably the most intuitive mechanism under a peer prediction se ing is the Output Agreement (OA) [24] mechanism. However, (OA) does not induce a truthful BNE if some agents know that they have received a minority signal. Yet in our mechanism, each agent's signal will be scored by an "informative" prediction given by the trained classi er, thus a truthful BNE will be induced. In this section we demonstrate the existence of a very simple Machine OA (MOA) mechanism that induces truthful BNE when ML elicitability conditions are satis ed.
as similarly done in Mechanism 1.
Pay worker
e idea is simply to check whether agent's report matches the classi er prediction. Denote by δ R := 1 − R D | =+1 ( f * ) − R D | =+1 ( f * ) (which we will prove to be positive later) and assume workers have perfect knowledge of the mechanism. We have the following results (where we use Const(·) to denote a constant that depends only on its inputs): T 7.1. With (MOA), when K ≥ Const1(δ p ,δ R , ∆, N ), N ≥ Const2(δ p ,δ R , ∆), and C p is set appropriately, every worker truthfully reporting is a BNE.
For concise presentation, we only provide some intuitive reasoning on why the mechanism works and how we obtain the results: rst we show that R D | =+1 ( f * ) + R D | =+1 ( f * ) < 1. e implication of this result is not unlike the p + +p − < 1 one, in that the optimal classi er's prediction is informative under Bayesian updates. Particularly similar to Lemma 2.1, we can show this condition is equivalent with Pr( i = s | f * (x i ) = s |) > P s , ∀s ∈ {+1, −1}. So in short, f * is "informative" in a posterior way. When the number of training samples is large enough, the trained classi erf * φ,−i is also going to be informative. Asˆ i is compared to an informative answer, worker i is be er o truth telling, due to Bayesian informativeness of his own observation proved in Lemma 2.1. e principal's goal is to design a mechanism M = (S, A) to induce a strict BNE where every worker exerts e ort and truthfully reports his observed signal. Denote P ({(x j ,˜ j )} T j=1 |{e j } T j=1 ) as an agent's belief about the realized labels of all agents when e ort levels e j 's are selected. en a mechanism M induces such a BNE if for K −i = {(x j ,˜ j )} j i ,
for all i, either that e i 1 orˆ i ˜ i , or both. We show that we can again design mechanisms using surrogate loss functions to incentivize both e ort and truth-telling. e truth telling part can be similarly established as for the e ort insensitive case, but a slightly di erent argument is needed for eliciting e ort. T 8.1. When K, N are large enough, S (ˆ i ,fφ ,−i (x i )) = −a ·φ unbias (fφ ,−i (x i ),˜ i ), along with the algorithm detailed in (MLP), induce a strict BNE for workers to exert e ort and report truthfully, with an appropriately selected scaling factor a > 0. P . (Sketch) Again for easiness of presentation we will omit the unbias subscript in φ. According to eorem 4.2, we know if all other workers exert e ort and report truthfully, if worker i decides to exert e ort, he will report truthfully. e only case we need to consider is when agent i chooses not to exert e ort. When agent i sets e i = 0, the negative of his expected utility is 6 E[φ ( f * ,ˆ i )|e
, regardless of his reporting strategy. We show the di erence between above and the case with exerting e ort and truthfully reporting is negative, which can be proved via using the fact that −E[φ ( f * ,˜ i )|e i = 1] > −E[φ ( f * , −˜ i )|e i = 1] (truth telling is be er than reverting):
Scaling up (−a · φ ( f * ,ˆ i )) will cover cost c so to make it incentive compatible to exert e ort.
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
We have introduced a new approach that connects information elicitation without veri cation with machine learning. We now summarize the practical advantages of this approach. First our mechanism does not heavily rely on obtaining redundant labels by assigning a task to multiple workers. Hence, we can save learning budget to more e ciently train a classi er as the performance of classi ers ties closely to the number of unique training data. Second, we remove the requirement of knowing the joint distribution of workers' signals; rather such statistics is learned through workers' reports (via learning workers' error rates). ird, our mechanism can easily handle (and are specialized for) heterogeneous tasks. Finally, our mechanism no long have the undesirable uninformative and permutation equilibria that most other peer prediction mechanisms have. Our mechanism is also robust when a small number of agents deviate from the equilibrium: this can be established by using the robustness of the training procedure. When a sublinear (in N ) N θ , 0 < θ < 1 number of agents deviate, this will create a O (N θ /N ) = O (N θ −1 ) bias in the learned surrogate loss function, as well as in the empirical loss de ned over training data. According to Lemma 5.5, the resultant classi er will still converge to the optimal one, with this additional converging error (in N ). Also agent's report will be evaluated against an accurate scoring function.
